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Introduction 
On November 5, 2009, United States Army Major Nidal Hasan 
killed thirteen people and injured at least thirty others in a mass 
shooting at the Fort Hood Army Post in Texas.1 Hasan was a military 
psychiatrist who was trained to counsel troops returning from combat. 
Some have questioned Hasan’s motives.2 Did terrorism motivate his 
actions? Religious beliefs? Or was it mental illness? Some psychologists 
speculate that Hasan suffered from a mental illness exacerbated by his 
high-pressure occupation, which contorted his religious beliefs and led 
him to commit this mass murder.3  
Before Hasan’s trial, he was granted the right to represent himself 
and conduct his own defense. The pretrial proceedings included a hear-
ing about Hasan’s mental health to determine whether he was 
competent to stand trial.4 The court determined that he was competent 
not only to stand trial but also to proceed pro se. During the trial, 
“[Hasan] called no witnesses, offered no testimony and declined to make 
any statements beyond a brief opening comment in which he took 
responsibility for the shooting and said he was a soldier who had 
decided to ‘switch sides’ in what he believed was a U.S. war against 
Islam.”5 The jury unanimously decided to impose the death penalty. 
After conducting his disastrous defense, Hasan was accused of 
intentionally seeking the death penalty.6 No matter his actual intent, 
the situation raises the questions of whether Hasan had a mental illness 
that impaired his ability to conduct his defense to the point that it cost 
him his life and whether the court had the proper tools to protect Hasan 
from himself. Hasan’s conviction is now going through the stages of a 
lengthy appeals process.7  
 
1. Soldier Opens Fire at Ft. Hood; 13 Dead, CBSNEWS (Nov. 5, 2009, 3:33 
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/soldier-opens-fire-at-ft-hood-13-dead/. 
2. See, e.g., Lauren Cox, Fort Hood Motive Terrorism or Mental Illness?, 
ABC News Medical Unit (Nov. 9, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
Health/MindMoodNews/fort-hood-shooters-intentions-mass-murder-terro 
rism/story?id=9019410&singlePage=true. 
3. See id.  
4. Chelsea J. Carter, Nidal Hasan Rests Case at Fort Hood Massacre Trial; 
Calls No Witnesses, CNN (Aug. 21, 2013, 3:32 PM), http://www. 
cnn.com/2013/08/21/justice/nidal-hasan-court-martial-wednesday/.  
5. Billy Kenber, Hasan Is Sentenced to Death for Fort Hood Rampage, 
Washington Post, Aug. 28, 2013, at A1 (quoting Hasan).  
6. Id. 
7. Will Weissert, Before Death, Fort Hood Shooter Nidal Hasan Faces Long 
Appeals, Washington Times, Aug. 29, 2013, at A07, available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/29/death-fort-hood-
shooter-nidal-hasan-faces-long-app/?page=all (“If he really wants the 
death penalty, the appeals process won’t let it happen for a very long 
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Further, consider Joshua Stafford, who attempted to bomb a bridge 
in Brecksville, Ohio, in April 2012. Stafford suffered with a two decade–
long history of mental illness.8 The court, however, determined that he 
was competent to stand trial because his history of mental illness did 
not prevent him from assisting in his defense.9 He was then allowed to 
represent himself.10 Based on the current ambiguous requirements to 
determine a defendant’s competency to self-represent, it was 
appropriate for the judge to allow Stafford to do so. At trial, Stafford 
faced many procedural issues acting as his own attorney.11 He was 
ultimately convicted of all charges after the jury deliberated for a mere 
ninety minutes.12 Stafford has since appealed his conviction.13  
 
time . . . . [The military is] not going to want to let the system kill him, 
even if that’s what he wants.”). 
8. Thomas Sheeran, Judge: Ohio Bomb Plot Suspect Is Fit for Trial, 
Associated Press, Apr. 15, 2013, http://seattletimes.com/html/nation 
world/2020784632_apusbridgebombplot.html; See also Kim Palmer, 
“Anarchist” Accused in Cleveland Bridge Bomb Plot Goes on Trial, 
Bangor Daily News, June 11, 2013, http://bangordailynews.com/ 
2013/06/11/news/nation/anarchist-accused-in-cleveland-bridge-bomb-
plot-goes-on-trial/ (“Sandra McPherson, a forensic psychologist hired by 
the defense said she had diagnosed Stafford as having serious mental 
health issues including bi-polar disorder, attention deficit disorder and 
post-traumatic stress syndrome from childhood physical abuse.”). 
9. United States v. Stafford, No. 1:12 CR 238, 2013 WL 1694033, at *4 (N.D. 
Ohio Apr. 18, 2013); See Sheeran, supra note 8 (“While fit to stand trial, 
Stafford ‘doesn’t cope very well,’ forensic psychologist Sandra McPherson 
testified. . . . ‘He tends to make rather poor decisions,’ . . . . She said 
Stafford has a preoccupation with death and had attempted suicide twice 
since she met him last year.”).  
10. Associated Press, Brecksville Bomb Suspect Allowed to Represent Himself, 
Newsnet5 Cleveland (May 22, 2013, 3:42 PM), http://www. 
newsnet5.com/news/local-news/oh-cuyahoga/brecksville-bomb-suspect-
allowed-to-represent-himself. 
11. See James F. McCarty, Accused Would-Be Bridge-Bomber Denies He 
Intended to Blow Up Ohio 82 Span, Rests Case, Cleveland.com (June 
13, 2013, 12:29 PM), http://impact.cleveland.com/metro/print.html?ent
ry=/2013/06/accused_would-be_bridge-bomber_3.html (“Stafford is 
acting as his own attorney, resulting in an unusual scenario in which he 
took the witness stand and posed questions to himself as a means of 
testifying on his own behalf.”). 
12. James F. McCarty, Federal Jury Convicts Would-Be Bridge-Bomber on 
All Counts, Cleveland.com (June 13, 2013, 8:52 PM), http://www. 
cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2013/06/federal_jury_convicts_would-
be.html.  
13. See Associated Press, Failed Bomb Plotter Joshua Stafford Appeals 
Conviction, Newsnet5 Cleveland (Oct. 10, 2013, 2:59 PM), http:// 
www.newsnet5.com/news/local-news/oh-cuyahoga/failed-bomb-plotter-
joshua-stafford-appeals-conviction. 
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Competence is defined as “[a] basic or minimal ability to do 
something.”14 While there is a well-established standard to determine 
whether a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial,15 our criminal 
justice system does not currently rely on any well-established standard 
to determine a defendant’s pro se competence (PSC)16 or the level of 
competence necessary for self-representation. The Supreme Court has 
left the decision solely to the discretion of the trial judge.17 Competency 
has been defined in different scenarios and at different stages within 
criminal proceedings. Instead, a specific standard should be created to 
determine whether a defendant is capable of proceeding through a trial 
without an attorney. This Note discusses the need for a definitive 
standard for judges to utilize when determining a defendant’s PSC and 
a method for formulating that standard using the framework of medical 
decision-making standards. 
The circumstances inherent to medical treatment decisions are 
similarly found in legal decision making. In the context of medical 
decision making, a patient must possess certain abilities in order to be 
determined competent to make autonomous treatment decisions. A 
patient is presumed competent unless proven otherwise. If a doctor 
provides medical care that a competent patient does not want, then the 
doctor’s actions may be found criminal.18 This concept presents a 
tension between patient autonomy and a court’s or doctor’s 
paternalism.19 In the same way, a defendant should be required to 
 
14. Black’s Law Dictionary 343 (10th ed. 2014). 
15. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). Though the standard 
for competence to stand trial is well established, it is important to point 
out that judges still struggle with the standard’s application. See, e.g., 
Holmes v. Levenhagen, 600 F.3d 756, 757 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
the district court had misapplied the standard and that the defendant’s 
schizophrenia and/or other conditions prevented him from engaging in 
sustained discussion of almost every aspect of his case or from otherwise 
working with counsel). The interpretation of the standard varies greatly 
depending on the facts of each case. While a proposed PSC standard 
would provide guidance to judges, the standard’s application should be 
similarly case specific and attuned to the defendant’s circumstances.  
16. The term “PSC” was used in James L. Knoll IV et al., A Pilot Survey of 
Trial Court Judges’ Opinions on Pro Se Competence After Indiana v. 
Edwards, 38 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry L. 536 (2010).  
17. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177 (2008) (“[Trial judges] will 
often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, 
tailored to the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant.”). 
18. Roger C. Jones & Timothy Holden, A Guide to Assessing Decision-
Making Capacity, 71 Clev. Clinic J. Med. 971, 971 (2004). 
19. If a doctor is unsure about a patient’s decision-making abilities, or if there 
is a disagreement between the doctor and patient on a proper course of 
action and the patient has questionable decision-making abilities, a 
determination of competency is left to a judge. The standard for finding 
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possess certain abilities in order to make his own legal decisions while 
conducting a criminal defense. If a judge requires a competent defen-
dant to accept counsel, it may be a violation of the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.20 Similarly, this situation creates tension between 
the defendant’s autonomy and the court’s or the attorney’s paternalism. 
Another analogy between medical decision-making capacity and PSC 
is the idea that there is a baseline level of competence required to make 
any decisions. In medical decision making, some patients—for example, 
those who are in a persistent vegetative state or severely mentally ill—
are unable to make any medical decisions for themselves.21 In the same 
way, a criminal defendant who does not meet a certain level of 
competence is not able to stand trial at all.22  
Because of the analogies between medical decision making and self-
representation, the capacities required to make autonomous medical 
decisions should be used to formulate a PSC standard. This Note 
describes the formulation and application of such a standard. Part I 
provides relevant background information that shows the development 
of competency in the legal system. Part II discusses competence in 
medical decision making, standards of performance for criminal 
attorneys, the detriment of mental illness to PSC, and other consid-
erations that are relevant to PSC. Part III discusses the formulation 
and application of a PSC standard. Finally, Part IV addresses several 
issues that may arise as side effects of adopting a PSC standard. 
I. Background 
A. Competence to Stand Trial 
In 1960, the Supreme Court enunciated the standard for 
competence to stand trial. In Dusky v. United States,23 the Court held 
that “the ‘test must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual 
 
a patient incompetent to make medical decisions is that of clear and 
convincing evidence. Raphael J. Leo, Competency and the Capacity to 
Make Treatment Decisions: A Primer for Primary Care Physicians, 1 
Primary Care Companion J. Clin. Psychiatry 131, 131 (1999). 
20. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (“The Sixth Amend-
ment . . . grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.”). 
But see Edwards, 554 U.S at 178 (“[T]he Constitution permits States to 
insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand 
trial . . . but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where 
they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”). 
21. Leo, supra note 19, at 131. 
22. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
23. Id.  
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understanding of the proceedings against him.’”24 The Dusky standard 
also applies to competence to waive the right to counsel and plead 
guilty.25  
In the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984,26 Congress kept this 
definition for competency, providing that a defendant is not competent 
to stand trial if he is “presently suffering from a mental disease or defect 
rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to 
understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him 
or to assist properly in his defense.”27 The Act requires courts to hold 
a separate competency hearing to make this determination.28 This test 
of competency has existed for many years, and every state has adopted 
some variation of this standard.29 For example, the Ohio competency 
statute provides, in relevant part, the following:  
A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial. If, after 
a hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence 
that, because of the defendant’s present mental condition, the 
defendant is incapable of understanding the nature and objective 
of the proceedings against the defendant or of assisting in the 
defendant’s defense, the court shall find the defendant 
incompetent to stand trial . . . .30 
Similarly, Texas law provides the following: 
(a) A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not 
have: 
(1) sufficient present ability to consult with the person’s law-
yer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or 
(2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceed-
ings against the person. 
 
24. Id. at 402 (quoting Solicitor General Rankin). 
25. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993).  
26. 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (2012).  
27. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). 
28. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(c). 
29. For a detailed comparison of the specifics of each state’s statute, see 
Douglas Mossman et al., AAPL Practice Guideline for the Forensic 
Psychiatric Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial, 35 J. Am. Acad. 
Psychiatry & L. S3, S59–67 tbl.3 (Supp. 2007). 
30. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.37(G) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014). 
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(b) A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and shall 
be found competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by 
a preponderance of the evidence.31 
While this competency standard is well established and widely adopted, 
competency in the context of self-representation is less straightforward.  
B. The Right to Self-Representation 
The American criminal justice system has only recognized the right 
to self-representation within the last forty years. In 1975, the Supreme 
Court held, in Faretta v. California,32 that the Sixth Amendment 
implies the right to self-representation: 
The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense 
shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally 
the right to make his defense. It is the accused, not counsel, who 
must be “informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,” 
who must be “confronted with the witnesses against him,” and 
who must be accorded “compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor.” Although not stated in the Amendment in so 
many words, the right to self-representation—to make one’s own 
defense personally—is thus necessarily implied by the structure 
of the Amendment.33 
In Faretta, the Court concluded that the defendant was “literate, 
competent, and understanding, and that he was voluntarily exercising 
his informed free will.”34 The Court also determined that the 
“[defendant’s] technical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to 
an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself.”35 
This language suggests that it was necessary for the defendant to 
competently and knowingly exercise his right to defend himself, but it 
does not elaborate further on the necessary requisites of competence or 
the mental state that is required to do so.36 The fundamental principle 
 
31. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.003 (West 2006). 
32. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
33. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (quoting U.S. Const. 
amend. VI). 
34. Id. at 835. 
35. Id. at 836. 
36. See Id. at 835 (holding that a defendant “should be made aware of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will 
establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes 
open’”) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 
279 (1942)). 
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of this opinion is to preserve the defendant’s autonomy,37 but the 
holding does not provide sufficient guidance on how to do so.  
The recognition of the right to self-representation did not come 
without controversy. Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Faretta ad-
dressed one of the initial concerns. The Chief Justice argued that “there 
is nothing desirable or useful in permitting every accused person, even 
the most uneducated and inexperienced, to insist upon conducting his 
own defense to criminal charges.”38 Further, he argued that the holding 
“can only add to the problems of an already malfunctioning criminal 
justice system.”39 At least one commentator, however, has rebutted this 
argument, suggesting that a criminal defendant may be just as capable 
as an “overworked public defender” in conducting the defense.40 The 
argument of whether a defendant is most capable of presenting his 
defense may be never ending, but the issue here is not to determine 
who would do the best job. The issue is whether the defendant has the 
basic capability, measured in terms of competency, to provide a defense 
that satisfies the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.  
C. Indiana v. Edwards 
For many years after establishing the constitutional right to 
conduct one’s own defense, the Court did not define a standard for 
PSC. Judges were largely without guidance on whether to respect the 
right to self-representation based on a defendant’s mental abilities. 
More than thirty years after Faretta, the Supreme Court held that there 
might be a higher standard of competency required for a defendant who 
wants to self-represent compared with the standard of competency to 
stand trial. In Indiana v. Edwards,41 the defendant was diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. After three competency hearings, several 
hospitalizations, and reviews of a lengthy record of psychiatric reports, 
the trial court concluded that although it appeared that the defendant 
was competent to stand trial, he was not competent to represent himself 
 
37. E. Lea Johnston, Representational Competence: Defining the Limits of 
the Right to Self-Representation at Trial, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 523, 
533 (2011). 
38. 422 U.S. at 837 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
39. Id. at 838.  
40. Mary E. Lewis, Recent Case, Criminal Procedure—Sixth Amendment—
Accused’s Right to Defend Pro Se—Rights Necessary for Fair 
Administration of Justice. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), 27 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 412, 434–36 (1976) (“The merits of being assisted 
by counsel are, in fact, not always overwhelming. It is conceivable that at 
least as adequate a defense might be mounted by an intelligent defendant 
whose sole concern is his own circumstance, and who has the time and 
singular motivation to explore possible defenses.”). 
41. 554 U.S. 164 (2008). 
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at the trial.42 The Supreme Court affirmed this decision, reasoning that 
allowing the defendant to self-represent, given his uncertain mental 
state, would lead to a humiliating spectacle and that the defendant’s 
lack of capacity could undercut the basic constitutional objective of 
providing a fair trial.43 In affirming Edwards, the Court held that “[t]he 
Constitution permits States to insist upon representation by counsel for 
those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer 
from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent 
to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.”44  
The Court recognized that there are “different capacities needed to 
proceed to trial without counsel” and that “there is little reason to 
believe that Dusky alone is sufficient.”45 But the Court did not 
enunciate a PSC standard, and instead it simply acknowledged that 
“the trial judge, particularly one such as the trial judge in this case, 
who presided over one of [the defendant’s] competency hearings and his 
two trials, will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental 
capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized circumstances of a 
particular defendant.”46 The Court declined to give more stringent 
guidance but acknowledged that the requisite PSC is different than the 
level of competence required to stand trial.47 Based on the application 
of this holding among the lower courts, it is clear that Edwards, while 
a step in the right direction, does not provide sufficient guidance to 
judges.  
1. Applying Edwards 
Several courts have discussed, interpreted, and applied Edwards. 
Each court essentially created its own interpretation of how to apply 
the Supreme Court’s holding. 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit elaborated on the 
discretionary guideline of Edwards. The circuit court held that when 
the issue of PSC is raised, the court must first determine whether the 
defendant suffers from a severe mental illness to the extent that he is 
not competent to conduct trial proceedings by himself. After that 
 
42. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 169 (2008).  
43. Id. at 176–77. 
44. Id. at 178. 
45. Id. at 177. 
46. Id.  
47. See id. at 175 (“[T]he nature of the problem before us cautions against 
the use of a single mental competency standard for deciding both (1) 
whether a defendant who is represented by counsel can proceed to trial 
and (2) whether a defendant who goes to trial must be permitted to 
represent himself.”). 
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determination, the judge may exercise discretion and limit that 
defendant’s right to self-representation.48  
The Superior Court of New Jersey provides an example of a 
defendant who was competent to stand trial but not to defend himself 
at trial.49 The judge’s finding that the defendant was not competent to 
represent himself was not only supported by a psychiatrist’s opinion 
but also by the defendant’s own conduct: 
During extensive pretrial colloquies with the court, defendant 
explained that the indictment did not apply to him and that he 
was not subject to the laws or jurisdiction of the State. He claimed 
immunity bestowed upon him by God and based upon his “foreign 
neutral status” as a minister by decree of “the Empress” and the 
President of the United States.50 
In United States v. Ferguson,51 the Ninth Circuit addressed a defen-
dant’s PSC when his behavior was “decidedly bizarre.”52 The defendant 
repeatedly demanded that his counsel follow his six made-up “duties” 
and requested that the judge recognize the “public policy” exception to 
the UCC and dismiss the case “for value.”53 At trial, the defendant did 
not do anything: 
no voir dire questions for the judge to ask, no opening argument, 
no closing argument, no objections, no cross-examination, no 
evidence, and no witnesses. At sentencing, he submitted three 
nonsensical motions, did not object to the PSR, and did not make 
any legal arguments.54  
 
48. United States v. McKinney, 373 F. App’x 74, 75 (D.C. Cir. 2010). This 
holding limits the application of Edwards to cases where the defendant 
suffers from mental illness. While this Note focuses on the effects of mental 
illness in determining PSC, it is not unforeseeable that there may be 
situations where a defendant does not suffer from mental illness but is 
still incompetent to self-represent. See, e.g., United States v. Carradine, 
621 F.3d 575, 577 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming denial of the defendant’s 
motion for self-representation—even though he did not suffer from mental 
illness—because when asked if he understood the nature of his charges 
and his possible sentencing, the defendant was “obstinate and hostile” 
and answered virtually every question by stating that he did not 
understand). 
49. See State v. McNeil, 963 A.2d 358, 362 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).  
50. Id. at 366 (quoting the defendant). 
51. 560 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2009). 
52. Id. at 1068.  
53. Id. at 1068–69.  
54. Id. at 1069. 
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The circuit court held that the “[d]efendant’s actions suggest that he 
might have been ‘unable to carry out the basic tasks needed to present 
his own defense without the help of counsel.’”55 
Some of these courts, such as D.C., have attempted to elaborate on 
the standard and create a framework for its application. Other courts 
noted in the aforementioned examples seem to have simply relied on 
the general principles in Edwards to protect incompetent defendants 
without a deeper analysis. These varying applications of Edwards 
evidence the need for a consistent PSC standard that takes into 
consideration the defendant’s present actions as well as his mental and 
behavioral history. 
2. Criticism and Commentary After Edwards 
Since Edwards, several scholars and commentators have discussed 
the meaning of its holding and what it means for the self-representing 
defendant. Some commentators have expressed apprehension about the 
holding and its possible effects on the criminal justice system as a 
whole.56 Several commentators, unsatisfied with the Court’s lack of 
guidance, have proposed their own criteria for PSC. One suggests that 
the defendant have at least “a de minimis understanding of both the 
 
55. Id. (quoting Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 175–76 (2008)).  
56. See, e.g., Alexander B. Feinberg, Casenote, Constitutional Law—Com-
petency and Self-Representation—Constitution Permits States to Limit a 
Defendant’s Self-Representation Right by Insisting Upon Representation 
by Counsel for Defendant Lacking Mental Competency. Indiana v. 
Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008), 39 Cumb. L. Rev. 567, 579–80 (2008–
2009) (“The criminal justice system faces numerous challenges when 
dealing with mentally incompetent defendants who seek to represent 
themselves, such as in Edwards. The courts are challenged to preserve 
respect for the autonomy of mentally ill defendants, preserve the public’s 
perception of the fairness of the proceedings, and achieve justice. In 
anticipation of such challenges, the Court in Edwards did not develop 
specific, stringent standards for situations concerning mentally 
incompetent defendants who wish to exercise their Sixth Amendment 
right to self-representation. Rather, the Court left the door open for 
judicial discretion in such situations and stated that “the Constitution 
permits judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant’s 
mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to conduct 
his own defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.”) (citing Edwards, 
55 U.S. at 177–78); Thomas L. Hafemeister, Developments in the United 
States Supreme Court, 27 Developments in Mental Health Law 53, 
56 (2008) (“What will be the effect of this ruling? Most likely, this ruling 
will directly affect the estimated 20% of self-representing defendants who 
are ordered to undergo competency evaluations. But because the majority 
did not adopt a clear standard or test for the level of competence required 
for self-representation, it is difficult to predict exactly when a defendant 
will be found competent to self-represent.”). 
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substantive and procedural law being applied against him.”57 The 
Court, however, has made clear that a defendant’s technical legal 
knowledge is “not relevant to the assessment of his knowing exercise of 
the right to defend himself,”58 so the “de minimis understanding” 
standard contravenes what little guidance the Court has provided. 
Another commentator argues that “[s]elf-representation is, at base, an 
exercise in problem solving” and derived a standard of competence 
based on social problem-solving theory.59 The Author notes the balance 
of the autonomy of the defendant versus the fairness of the proceeding 
as a reason for implementing such a standard; it is possible, however, 
that a PSC standard based on problem solving may not account for the 
implications of self-representation on the defendant’s future freedom.60  
So, what do we do with a mentally ill defendant who is competent 
to stand trial under Dusky but who is “unable to carry out the basic 
tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of counsel”?61 
The latter issue has not been assigned such a clear-cut standard as the 
former.62 If a well-established standard exists to determine if someone 
 
57. Reed Willis, Note, A Fool for a Client: Competency Standards in Pro Se 
Cases, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 321, 333. 
58. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975). See also Jones v. Norman, 
633 F.3d 661, 667 (8th Cir. 2011). In Jones, the trial court denied the 
defendant’s request to represent himself because he was not familiar with 
the Missouri Rules of Criminal Procedure, he was unable to state the 
exact range of penalties he faced on each count, and he was not able to 
take trial notes as quickly as a lawyer might have. The court of appeals’ 
holding that these factors were insufficient to bar the defendant from 
representing himself was inappropriate. Id. at 667–68. The court went on 
to explain that had the defendant “been unable or unwilling to conduct 
his own defense without disrupting the essence of the trial process, the 
court would have had the authority to revoke [Defendant’s] right to 
represent himself.” Id. at 669 (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 
(1970)). 
59. Johnston, supra note 37, at 526. 
60. Id. (“Balancing the competing norms implicated by self-representation, 
this Article suggests that a defendant capable of autonomous decision-
making should be allowed to control his defense, unless a defendant’s self-
representation poses a grave threat to the reliability or fairness of the 
proceeding.”). 
61. Indiana v. Edwards, 544 U.S. 164, 175–76 (2008).  
62. Id. at 178 (declining to set a more specific standard for the denial of self-
representation); see also id. at 189 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (“Today’s 
holding is extraordinarily vague. . . . It holds only that lack of mental 
competence can under some circumstances form a basis for denying the 
right to proceed pro se . . . . We will presumably give some meaning to 
this holding in the future . . . .”); Douglas Morris & Richard Frierson, Pro 
Se Competence in the Aftermath of Indiana v. Edwards, 36 J. Am. Acad. 
Psychiatry L. 551, 555 (2008) (“[I]t is unclear what standard would 
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is competent enough to invoke his constitutional right to a trial by his 
peers, then a similar type of standard should exist to assist judges in 
the evaluation of PSC when letting someone invoke their constitutional 
right to self-representation.  
Next, Part II outlines the relevant considerations in forming a PSC 
standard.  
II. Considerations for Determining PSC 
A. Conducting an Effective Defense 
The first consideration is the most obvious: is the defendant capable 
of conducting an effective defense? The intricacies of trial tactics are 
vast. An attorney is required to use logical reasoning skills, problem-
solving tactics, and creativity to conduct a defense. His client’s freedom 
is at risk. An attorney’s actions must reach a certain level of 
reasonableness in order to protect his client’s Sixth Amendment rights. 
If this standard is not achieved, then a criminal defendant’s conviction 
can be overturned.63 This takes skill, contemplation, patience, 
innovation, and diligence. Not even every person with a law degree can 
present an effective criminal defense.  
When the accused is allowed to be his own lawyer, the standard of 
reasonableness of performance for a defense attorney is not applicable. 
This is because under Edwards, a determination of a criminal 
defendant’s technical knowledge of the law is not relevant to the 
decision of whether to allow him to defend himself.64 A standard for 
PSC, however, should at least consider a defendant’s ability to carry 
out “important tasks such as organizing one’s defense, making motions, 
arguing points of law, participating in voir dire, questioning witnesses, 
and addressing the court and jury.”65 
Though a defendant’s technical knowledge is not pertinent to his 
PSC, his mental incapacities could be. Some attorneys with mental 
illness may not be fit to represent clients.66 By the same reasoning, some 
mentally ill criminal defendants may not be fit to self-represent. 
B. The Effects of Mental Illness on PSC  
A second consideration is how different mental illnesses may impair 
a defendant’s PSC. Different mental illnesses and their symptoms can  
differentiate a defendant who is merely competent to stand trial from one 
who is competent both to stand trial and to represent himself.”). 
63. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (“[T]he Sixth Amend-
ment accord[s] criminal defendants a right to ‘counsel rendering 
reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances.’”).  
64. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 172.  
65. Knoll IV et al., supra note 16, at 537. 
66. See Len Klingen, The Mentally Ill Attorney, 27 Nova L. Rev. 157, 159 
(2002). 
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affect a defendant’s decision-making process and undermine his ability 
to conduct a legitimate defense. These disorders may render the 
defendant competent to stand trial but in a condition in which he 
should not be allowed to represent himself at the trial. In Edwards, the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA) and the American Academy 
of Psychiatry and the Law (AAPL) filed a joint amicus brief arguing 
that “[d]isorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention and 
concentration, impaired expressive abilities, anxiety, and other common 
symptoms of severe mental illnesses can impair the defendant’s ability 
to play the significantly expanded role required for self-representation 
even if he can play the lesser role of represented defendant.”67 Several 
examples of mental illnesses in particular may cause such impairment.  
The most prevalent and unpredictable disorder that can affect the 
defendant’s decision-making abilities is schizophrenia.68 Schizophrenia 
is characterized by a combination of delusions, hallucinations, disorg-
anized speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior, and negative 
symptoms.69 This impairment may prevent the accused from being able 
to think logically about the consequences of his actions and further 
prevent him from communicating his defense to the court and to the 
jury.  
Depressive disorders may also negatively affect a defendant’s self-
representation. These disorders encompass a variety of illnesses that 
include common features such as “the presence of sad, empty, or 
irritable mood, accompanied by somatic and cognitive changes that 
significantly affect the individual’s capacity to function.”70 When a 
criminal defendant is depressed, he may not care about the outcome of 
the trial, may not be interested in conducting an effective defense, and, 
in death penalty cases, may actually be trying to end his life by 
conviction.71 Even if a criminal defendant seems lucid and intelligent,  
67. Brief for The American Psychiatric Association and American Academy 
of Psychiatry & the Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 
26, Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008) (No. 07-208) [hereinafter 
APA & AAPL Brief]. 
68. See generally Yang Tae Kim et al., Deficit in Decision-Making in Chronic, 
Stable Schizophrenia: From a Reward and Punishment Perspective, 6 
Psychiatry Investigation 26 (2009) (discussing the effects of 
schizophrenia on a patient’s decision-making abilities). 
69. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders: DSM-5 100 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]. 
70. Id. at 155. 
71. See, e.g., State v. Berry, 706 N.E.2d 1273, 1273 (Ohio 1999) (indicating 
that the defendant “had expressed his desire to forgo further review of his 
convictions and death sentence”); see also Information on Defendants 
Who Were Executed Since 1976 and Designated as “Volunteers,” Death 
Penalty Information Center (July 29, 2013), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/information-defendants-who-were-
executed-1976-and-designated-volunteers (providing a list of execution 
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his depression may overshadow his abilities to properly advocate for his 
own liberty.72  
Even less noticeable than other disorders, an anxiety disorder could 
affect a defendant’s performance in a marked way. Anxiety disorders 
include a group of disorders characterized by “features of excessive fear 
and anxiety and related behavioral disturbances.”73 Social Anxiety 
Disorder includes a “marked fear or anxiety about one or more social 
situations in which the individual is exposed to possible scrutiny by 
others.”74 Presenting your own defense at a trial would fall into this 
category. This condition could case fear, anxiety, or avoidance of the 
situation where the defendant is exposed to scrutiny.75 The fear, 
anxiety, or avoidance can “interfere significantly with the 
individual’s . . . occupational or academic functioning,”76 which could 
translate into interference with the ability to conduct his own defense.  
There are several other mental illnesses that could significantly 
impair a defendant’s decision-making abilities while still rendering the 
defendant competent to stand trial, including delirium and dementia,77 
extreme phobia or panic,78 and obsessive-compulsive disorder.79 Some 
eating disorders may even affect a defendant’s decision-making 
 
“volunteers,” i.e., those who had chosen to waive at least part of their 
available appeals at their time of execution); John H. Blume, Killing the 
Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and Competency, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 939, 
940 n.5 (2005) (“‘Volunteer’ is the term generally used for a death row 
inmate who waives his or her appeals in the academic literature as well 
as in the capital defense community.”) (citing G. Richard Strafer, 
Volunteering for Execution: Competency, Voluntariness and the Propriety 
of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 860 (1983)). 
72. Several depressive orders are associated with symptoms that may have a 
marked effect on a defendant’s decision-making abilities. Major Depress-
ive Disorder can include symptoms such as “[f]eelings of worthlessness or 
excessive or inappropriate guilt (which may be delusional) nearly every 
day,” or a “[d]iminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, 
nearly every day.” DSM-5, supra note 69, at 161. Persistent Depressive 
Disorder, or Dysthymia, can include symptoms of “[p]oor concentration 
or difficulty making decisions” accompanying a depressed mood that has 
lasted for at least two years. Id. at 168. 
73. Id. at 189. 
74. Id. at 202. 
75. See id. (noting that the social situations “almost always provoke fear or 
anxiety” and “are avoided or endured with intense fear or anxiety”). 
76. Id.  
77. See id. at 591. 
78. See id. at 190.  
79. See id. at 235–36.  
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processes and increase symptoms of impulsivity.80 This list is not 
exhaustive, and there are many different forms of mental incapacities 
that can affect a defendant’s ability to self-represent. The incapacities 
of the mentally ill are limitless and complex, and these symptoms can 
have a varying impact on the accused’s behavior throughout the trial. 
Therefore, it is important to analyze the effects that particular inca-
pacities have on each defendant’s abilities. 
C. Competence in Different Contexts 
Finally, the analysis must consider various standards of competence 
in related contexts. To formulate a PSC standard, this Note looks 
specifically to patient competence in medical decision making and 
attorney competence when defending a client.  
1. Medical Decision Making 
Competence to make medical decisions is comparable to compe-
tence to make your own legal decisions and thus comparable to PSC.81 
In both instances, there is great tension between the court’s paternalism 
and the individual’s autonomy. When a medical patient chooses whe-
ther to receive or refuse care contrary to a doctor’s recommendation, a 
court may be required to determine the patient’s level of competency 
before it can be sure that the patient’s decision was truly autonomous. 
The court looks at the task that the patient faces, and makes a 
competence inquiry based on that task alone, as opposed to making a 
blanket decision about the patient’s general competence.82 In 
conducting this narrow inquiry, the court assesses a patient’s capacity 
to meet certain standards and then determines whether the patient is 
competent based on his abilities.83 There are some instances where an 
individual is deemed generally incompetent and thus incapable of 
making any rational treatment decisions.84   
80. See generally Ignasi Garrido and Susana Subirá, Decision-Making and 
Impulsivity in Eating Disorder Patients, 207 Psychiatric Res. 107 (2013) 
(discussing the effects of eating disorders on relevant mental capacities). 
81. As discussed above, Faretta held that the Sixth Amendment necessarily 
implied the right to self-representation. See supra Part I.B. Analogously, 
“[p]atients have the fundamental right of self-determination in medical 
care.” Jones & Holden, supra note 18, at 971. 
82. See Leo, supra note 19, at 131 (“To ensure that individuals retain as much 
autonomy or self-determination as is legally possible, the court makes a 
determination of one’s competence in a task-specific manner. For example, 
one can be determined to be incompetent to execute a will, but may be 
deemed competent to make treatment decisions.”). 
83. See id. (“[C]ompetency refers to the mental ability and cognitive 
capabilities required to execute a legally recognized act rationally.”). 
84. See id. (discussing several examples, including “individuals who are in 
persistent vegetative states” and patients who are “actively psychotic”). 
This basic level of general incompetence is comparable to a criminal 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 4·2015 
The Spectrum of Competency 
1255 
Although the medical community has not adopted a “single 
clinically accepted standard of decision-making capacity,” there are 
several abilities that a patient must possess in order to be capable of 
making his own medical decisions.85 When a court assesses a medical 
patient’s “capacity to make reasoned decisions regarding treatment,” it 
considers four broad patient abilities86: (1) the “[a]bility to communicate 
a choice”; (2) the “ability to understand relevant information”; (3) the 
“ability to appreciate the nature of the situation and its likely 
consequences”; and (4) the “ability to manipulate information 
rationally.”87  
One group of scholars has analyzed these factors and discussed their 
application as part of a standard of competence in medical decision 
making.88 When drafting a standard of competence from these factors, 
their discussion notes that it is important to determine what level of 
“clinically assessed incapacity” will render a patient incompetent.89 
Medical or mental health professionals can assess incapacity, and then 
a court can determine competency based on possible incapacities.90  
When assessing these factors in a standard of competence, a 
patient’s decision-making process is considered. A doctor might not 
agree with a patient’s treatment choice, but the choice might still weigh 
toward a finding of competency if the patient utilized a rational 
decision-making process. If the patient can show a “logical process” of 
decision making, then the rationality of the patient’s decision may 
outweigh the reasonableness of the actual choice.91  
 
defendant’s incompetence to stand trial. If the defendant is incapable of 
participating in the trial proceedings, generally, because of some sort of 
mental defect, then he is surely incapable of doing anything requiring 
greater ability, such as conducting his own defense.  
85. Jones & Holden, supra note 18, at 971–72. 
86. Leo, supra note 19, at 133. 
87. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Com-
petence Study I: Mental Illness and Competence to Consent to Treatment, 
19 L. & Hum. Behav. 105, 109–10 (1995). 
88. Jessica Berg et al., Constructing Competence: Formulating Standards of Legal 
Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 345 (1996). 
89. Id. at 349.  
90. Id. at 348–49 (explaining that legislatures may establish the type and 
degree of “clinically assessed incapacity” that will permit the court to 
declare legal incompetence). 
91. Id. at 367 (“Thus, a patient who erroneously believes that treatment 
would cause him to shrink demonstrates logical decisionmaking when he 
refuses treatment because he does not want to become microscopically 
small.”). 
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2. Attorney Competence 
Attorneys must “provide competent representation to a client.”92 
This “requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
reasonably necessary for the representation.”93 An attorney does not 
need to be a master of a particular issue, but rather the attorney needs 
to possess general skills “such as the analysis of precedent, the 
evaluation of evidence and legal drafting,” and the ability to determine 
“what kind of legal problems a situation may involve.”94 An attorney 
does not have to be competent before accepting representation, so long 
as he can become competent after reasonable preparation.95 A lawyer 
must thoroughly and adequately prepare to handle a certain matter 
and must maintain competence throughout representation.96 
If an attorney does not provide competent representation when 
conducting a criminal defense, the representation may violate the 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 
In Strickland v. Washington,97 the Supreme Court held that “the proper 
standard for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective 
assistance”98 and that “[t]he proper measure of attorney performance 
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”99 
In order to establish that his counsel’s assistance was ineffective, a 
convicted defendant must make two showings: (1) “that counsel’s 
performance was deficient” and (2) “that the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense.”100 To meet the first prong, the defendant must 
show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 
Amendment.”101 To meet the second prong, the defendant must show 
“that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a 
fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”102 The Court has since dis-
cussed Strickland to provide examples of conduct that may constitute  
92. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1 (2011). 
93. Id.  
94. Id. at cmt. 2. 
95. Id. at cmt. 4.  
96. Id. at cmt. 5–6. 
97. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
98. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
99. Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment relies “on the legal profession’s 
maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law’s presumption that 
counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment 
envisions.” Id. 
100. Id. at 687.  
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
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ineffective assistance. Examples include failure to present or uncover 
mitigating evidence103 and failure to communicate formal plea offers 
with a client.104  
This level of competence is relevant to PSC because it reminds us 
that the underlying principle is to respect the defendant’s Sixth Amend-
ment rights. An ideal PSC standard would help judges determine 
whether a defendant can respect his own Sixth Amendment rights or if 
a defendant has a mental incapacity that causes him to conduct a 
defense that undermines his own rights.  
Based on all of these relevant considerations, Part III formulates a 
PSC standard and discusses the standard’s application.  
III. A PSC Standard  
A. Why We Need a Standard 
Conducting your own criminal defense is complicated.105 As argued 
by the APA & AAPL, “self-representation involves a substantially 
expanded role for the defendant and hence requires significantly greater 
capabilities than those required for a sound trial of charges against a 
represented defendant.”106 While it is surely important to respect a 
person’s autonomy when deciding how to proceed with his criminal 
defense, the performance of a self-representing defendant raises the 
question of whether the risk to his liberty outweighs the importance of 
his autonomy if he does not understand and appreciate the gravity of 
the situation. Some defendants have been successful and epitomize the 
importance of the right to self-representation.107 Others, however, have 
lost their freedom in the courtroom.108 While it is important to respect 
Faretta, it is similarly important to respect a defendant’s liberty.  
A mentally ill defendant may not know that what he is saying 
throughout his self-representation is nonsensical, unintelligent, and 
even dangerous. A defendant with mental illness may be incapable of 
appreciating the severity of the consequences that accompany each and 
 
103. See Porter v. McCullom, 530 U.S. 30, 39 (2009) (“Counsel thus failed to 
uncover and present any evidence of Porter’s mental health or mental 
impairment, his family background, or his military service. The decision 
not to investigate did not reflect reasonable professional judgment.”); 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).  
104. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (“When defense counsel 
allowed the [plea] offer to expire without advising the defendant or 
allowing him to consider it, defense counsel did not render the effective 
assistance the Constitution requires.”). 
105. See supra Part II.A. 
106. APA & AAPL Brief, supra note 67, at 25–26.  
107. See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).  
108. See, e.g., supra notes 1–13 and accompanying text. 
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every decision made during a trial. It is not important that the accused 
have the tenacity and competence of a skilled trial attorney, but it is 
important that the defendant be in a mental state where he can have 
the opportunity to conduct an adequate defense.  
Additionally, there are accepted standards of performance required 
for an attorney to perform at a level that respects a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights.109 If an attorney must meet certain 
“reasonableness” standards, then it follows that a defendant should also 
have to meet certain standards to respect his own Sixth Amendment 
rights. It is not enough to say that a defendant’s exercise of autonomy 
is equivalent to the exercise of his rights. The fundamental principle of 
Faretta was to respect a defendant’s autonomy.110 However, a defendant 
cannot make an autonomous decision without the competence to do so. 
A clear standard of competence is necessary to protect the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial and to give judges a clear and 
concise roadmap to follow in order to protect the defendant’s liberty 
interests while still respecting the court’s efficiency interests.111  
B. Applying Medical Decision-Making Criteria to PSC 
Formulating a standard of competence for PSC presents the same 
challenges that arise in formulating a standard of competence to make 
medical decisions. The standard must balance the paternalism of 
limiting a person’s choice without unnecessarily burdening that person’s 
autonomy.112 Additionally, a governing standard for decision-making 
competence of any kind can be vague and confusing when “developed 
through case law or statutes.”113 Looking at case-law precedent presents 
a special challenge because any standard that a court creates is “highly  
109. See supra Part II.C.2.  
110. Johnston, supra note 37, at 533.  
111. See Conor P. Cleary, Note, Flouting Faretta: The Supreme Court’s 
Failure to Adopt a Coherent Communication Standard of Competency 
and the Threat to Self-Representation after Indiana v. Edwards, 63 Okla. 
L. Rev. 145 (2010). 
112. See, e.g., Berg et al., supra note 88, at 377 (“[T]he choice between 
standards involves balancing the extent to which a failure to demonstrate 
the ability measured by a component [of the standard] indicates impaired 
autonomy in decision making against whether such a failure is sufficient 
basis for limiting a patient’s decisionmaking authority. Although seriously 
impaired people should be protected, the right to make decisions for 
oneself should not be burdened more than is absolutely necessary.”); 
Dennis ex rel. Butko v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880, 901 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Legal 
competence inquiries necessarily place emphasis on honoring the 
autonomy of an individual who has expressed desire for a recognized 
treatment within the system, while at the same time assuring that the 
individual retains sufficient autonomy as to the decision at issue that his 
choice should be respected.”). 
113. Berg et al., supra note 88, at 375. 
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sensitive to the fact situation of the case on which they are based, 
leaving residual uncertainty as to whether other standards might be 
applied by the same court in other circumstances.”114 Because of this 
challenge, it is important that a proposed standard be specific enough 
to provide proper guidance to judges yet general enough that the judge 
may still exercise broad discretion based on the factual circumstances. 
Applying the same four elements that compose the criteria to make 
autonomous medical decisions will allow a court to do exactly this.115  
1. Ability to Communicate a Choice  
The first element of the standard will be to look at the defendant’s 
ability to communicate a choice. A criminal defendant needs to be able 
to clearly and coherently demonstrate that he wishes to waive his right 
to counsel and proceed to trial as his own attorney. Additionally, a 
defendant must be able to reach and communicate a decision about 
essential elements of his self-representation. If there is evidence that he 
will be unable to do this, then he should not be allowed to represent 
himself.116 The defendant must also be able to “maintain and 
communicate stable choices long enough for them to be 
implemented.”117 The element of communication should be the basic 
threshold element to determine competency, but the court should not 
look at communication ability alone to determine competence. If the 
court looked at communication alone, then no weight would be given 
to the decision-making process that led to the defendant’s communi-
cated choice.118  
 
114. Id. It then follows why the Court in Edwards may have declined to accept 
Indiana’s proposed standard of PSC requiring that a defendant have the 
ability to “communicate coherently with the court or a jury” in order to 
proceed pro se. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008) (quoting 
Brief for Petitioner at 20). While the issue in Edwards may have been 
related to the defendant’s ability to communicate, communication may 
not be the issue in every case of PSC.  
115. For a list of these four criteria, see supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
116. Essential elements of self-representation would include things like the 
choice of whether or not to testify, the choice to respect the Federal Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, and the choice to participate in all elements of the 
trial, such as voir dire, opening statements, and cross-examination.  
117. Leo, supra note 19, at 133. Leo provides examples of individuals that 
would be unable to communicate a choice: “an individual who rapidly 
changes his or her decision from moment to moment and a psychotic 
patient who is mute are deemed unable to evidence a choice.” Id. The 
same situations would deem a criminal defendant unable to communicate 
a choice.  
118. See generally Berg et al., supra note 88, at 353 (“Used alone, this standard 
would offer the greatest protection for individual decision making rights 
because it focuses simply on communication and disregards the 
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2. Ability to Understand Relevant Information 
The second element looks at the defendant’s ability to understand 
relevant information. This is the most common ability required by 
courts and legislatures in competence evaluations for medical decision 
making, and it “focuses on the patient’s comprehension of information 
related to the particular decision at hand.”119 In the same way, a 
criminal defendant must be able to comprehend the information related 
to his representation, the nature of his charges, and the courtroom 
proceedings. This element does not require the defendant be able to 
“comprehend the situation as a whole” but simply “the concepts 
involved.”120 A defendant’s understanding can be gauged by asking him 
to explain his understanding of the different elements of self-
representation during pretrial proceedings.121 While this basic element 
of understanding is important in determining whether a defendant is 
giving informed consent to the nature and consequences of his actions, 
it does not take into account the defendant’s ability to actually 
appreciate the nature and consequences of his choices.122 Therefore, the 
third element is essential to a PSC determination.  
3. Ability to Appreciate the Situation and Its Likely Consequences 
The third—and arguably most important—element of the standard 
looks at the defendant’s ability to appreciate the nature of self-
representation and the likely consequences of undertaking self-
representation. This requires the defendant be able to “apply 
information that is understood in a content-neutral sense to his or her 
own situation.”123 The defendant must be able to understand not only 
the elements of self-representation but also how these elements apply 
to his particular case. The element of appreciation “is a rather indi-
vidualized component of the capacity assessment.”124 The defendant 
must prove that he weighed the options of proceeding with and without 
counsel in his particular situation and show that he appreciates the 
risks of his choice and nevertheless wishes to make the choice to self-
 
decisionmaking process. It would, however, allow a number of patients 
with poor decisionmaking capacity to make decisions.”). 
119. Id. at 353.  
120. Id. at 354.  
121. Cf. Leo, supra note 19, at 133 (“The ability to understand relevant 
information can be best assessed by asking patients to disclose their 
understanding of the proposed treatment intervention or diagnostic 
procedure. It is best to ask them to paraphrase it.”). 
122. See generally Berg et al., supra note 88, at 354 (distinguishing between 
understanding and appreciating).  
123. Id. at 355.  
124. Leo, supra note 19, at 133.  
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self-represent.125 This element accounts for delusional symptoms that a 
defendant may have as a result of a mental illness.126 In addition to 
delusional beliefs, this element may also take into account flaws in the 
defendant’s decision-making process as a result of mental illness. The 
appreciation element would require a defendant show comprehension of 
his consequences, and flawed logic behind this comprehension could be 
clear evidence that the defendant does not really appreciate the nature 
and consequences of self-representation. For this reason, it is important 
to look at the decision-making process that led to the defendant’s 
appreciation. This brings the proposed standard to the fourth and final 
element. 
4. Ability to Manipulate Information Rationally  
The fourth element looks at the defendant’s “ability to manipulate 
information rationally.”127 This requires that a defendant show the logic 
behind his decision-making process in order to assess the defendant’s 
“reasoning capacity or ability to employ logical thought processes to 
compare the risks and benefits” of his different options.128 This element 
must be part of a compound standard of competence, as it relies on the 
defendant’s reasoning behind his decisions.129 It is important, however, 
to evaluate the logic of the decision-making process and not the 
outcome of the decision itself.130 Similar to the third element, the 
rational manipulation element provides an opportunity to weigh the 
symptoms of a defendant’s mental illness on his ability to self-
represent.131  
125. See generally id. at 134 (“The assessment of the individual’s capacity to 
appreciate is, therefore, based upon an examination of the ability of the 
individual to weigh various treatment benefits and risks against personal 
values and choices.”).  
126. Berg et al., supra note 88, at 356 (“The appreciation criterion recognizes 
that delusional beliefs properly affect competence determinations only to 
the extent that they affect the patient’s ability to appreciate the relevance 
of information to his or her own circumstances.”).  
127. Id. at 357. 
128. Id.  
129. Id. at 357–58.  
130. See generally id. at 358 (“Inclusion of rational manipulation in a legal 
standard of competence may seem troublesome because it could lead to 
incompetence adjudications based simply on the unconventionality of a 
patient’s decision.”); see also Leo, supra note 19, at 134 (“This component 
does not focus on the ultimate decision that the patient makes, but rather 
the process with which he or she arrives at decisions.”). 
131. See Leo, supra note 19, at 134. Leo lists many cognitive features that are 
important to an individual’s ability to manipulate information. “These 
include disturbances in thought form (i.e., circumstantial or tangential 
thought process), delusions, and illusions or hallucinations. The behavior 
of the patient, relevant mood states, stability and appropriateness of 
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All four of these elements, combined into a compound PSC stan-
dard, will guide courts in determining whether a criminal defendant is 
competent to represent himself without violating his own Sixth Amend-
ment rights. The elements take into account the implications of mental 
illness in a defendant’s ability without requiring mental illness for a 
determination of incompetency. This leaves a judge with a broad 
standard that can be applied subjectively on a careful, case-specific 
basis that focuses solely on PSC instead of a defendant’s blanket level 
of competence. This standard will prevent a criminal defendant from 
“humiliating” himself or making a “spectacle” of his self-representation, 
which concern arose in Edwards.132 
C. Pretrial Hearing 
A determination of PSC should require an additional competency 
hearing—separate from the hearing for competency to stand trial. 
During this hearing, the court should take into account testimony from 
mental health experts, family of the accused, and any other witness 
who may have experience with the defendant’s abilities. This includes, 
but is not limited to, doctors, teachers, employers, coworkers, and 
friends. Of these witnesses, the most weight should be given to 
testimony from mental health experts, but it is up to the judge to make 
the final decision about what other factors to incorporate and weigh in 
the determination.133 The judge should further consider the defendant’s 
own testimony, attitude, and conduct in making the determination.  
 
affective states, thought form and content, and perceptual disturbances 
must be carefully documented when a capacity assessment is conducted.” 
Id. All of these features are important to determining PSC. If a defendant 
exhibits any of these cognitive deficits, then his ability to make an 
autonomous decision to self-represent may be faulty and thus render him 
incompetent.  
132. The Edwards Court held that “a right of self-representation at trial will 
not ‘affirm the dignity’ of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to 
conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel.” Indiana v. 
Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (internal citation omitted). The Court 
was concerned that letting an incompetent defendant represent himself 
could not serve to protect the defendant’s Constitutional rights. See id. 
at 176–77 (“[G]iven th[e] defendant’s uncertain mental state, the spectacle 
that could well result from his self-representation at trial is at least as 
likely to prove humiliating as ennobling. Moreover, insofar as a 
defendant’s lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or sentence, 
self-representation in that exceptional context undercuts the most basic 
of the Constitution’s criminal law objectives, providing a fair trial.”).  
133. Requiring a judge to have the final word has also been supported by other 
commentators. See Jennifer L. Moore & Katherine Ramsland, Com-
petence Assessment, Diverse Abilities, and a Pro Se Standard, 39 J. 
Psychiatry & L. 297, 317 (2011). (“[M]ental health experts should be 
part of the evaluation team. However, to protect the defendant’s auton-
omy, the judge would remain the final arbiter.”). 
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D. Applying the PSC Standard 
Because a criminal defendant’s autonomy and liberty are both at 
risk, the court must reach a delicate balance in deciding whether to 
allow self-representation. A specific PSC standard should require 
greater abilities than those necessary to stand trial. The standard 
should be subjective and applied on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis. 
When applying the standard, the judge should take into account the 
defendant’s mental health history and the specific symptoms that come 
with particular mental illnesses. The judge should evaluate whether any 
of the symptoms could greatly impair the defendant’s decision-making 
ability and should limit or deny self-representation if the answer to that 
inquiry is in the affirmative.134 While a mental illness is not dispositive 
of incompetence, consideration should be given to the effects of the 
illness when applying every factor of the standard.135 In some medical 
decision-making cases, however, a medical patient’s denial that he has 
a mental illness can render him incompetent to make medical treatment 
decisions.136 In the same way, a criminal defendant’s denial that he has 
a mental illness, in light of strong evidence to the contrary, may be 
compelling evidence in itself that he is incompetent to represent himself 
based on the reasoning behind this incorrect belief. 
 
134. Essentially, the judge should consider the effects of mental illness on a 
defendant’s “decisional competence.” For an in-depth discussion of the 
elements of a person’s decisional competence, see Richard J. Bonnie, The 
Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 539, 573–75 (1993).  
135. This is not to say, however, that a defendant will only be found incom-
petent to represent himself if he suffers from a mental illness. See Berg et 
al., supra note 88, at 368–69 (“[M]ental illness is not a homogenous 
category; many different types of disorders can be thought of as mental 
illnesses and cognitive functioning can vary across and within diagnostic 
categories. Thus, . . . competence determinations must always be made 
on an individual basis. . . . Mental illness is not equivalent to 
incompetence; many people who suffer from mental illness, even the most 
severe forms, are competent to make . . . decisions.”). 
136. Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Medication: Revisiting the Role of 
Denial of Mental Illness in Capacity Determinations, 22 S. Cal. Rev. L. 
& Soc. Just. 167, 170–71 (2013) (“At least fourteen courts have 
considered a patient’s denial that he or she has a mental illness (in other 
words, lack of insight, or failing to perceive one’s mental illness) to lead 
to a finding of incapacity. In some of these cases, the patient’s denial is 
clearly the basis of the incapacity finding. In others, denial is one factor 
among many that the courts look to, or at least mention, in deciding 
capacity. And in at least one case, the court did not permit the patient’s 
doctor to introduce evidence of denial because the state statute referred 
solely to the nature, risks, and benefits of the treatment. That court used, 
in part, a patently false belief standard, and perhaps was influenced by 
my earlier work that stated a denial should not be a basis for finding 
incompetency.”). 
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IV. Other Issues That May Arise 
A. Ineffective Assistance—of Yourself? 
When an attorney represents a client in a criminal matter, the 
attorney’s performance must reach a minimum level of reasonableness 
to amount to effective assistance in accordance with the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.137 Faretta held that a defendant 
could not claim the same type of ineffective assistance after deciding to 
serve as his own counsel.138 In a scenario where the defendant later 
claims that he should not have been allowed to represent himself, the 
inquiry will rest on whether the court properly applied the PSC 
standard and not on the negative outcomes of self-representation. This 
would essentially be an “abuse of discretion” review. The Second 
Circuit has conducted a similar review.  
In United States v. VanHoesen,139 the Second Circuit upheld the 
district court’s determination that the defendant was competent to 
represent himself. The defendant requested to represent himself at the 
trial but afterward appealed, claiming that his self-representation was 
a “travesty” demonstrating “awful judgment.”140 Essentially, the 
defendant claimed ineffective assistance of himself in violation of his 
Sixth Amendment right as a result of the trial court’s abuse of discre-
tion.141 The court determined that there was ample support for the 
district court to allow self-representation, including the defendant’s 
“written submissions to the district court demonstrating his active 
interest in his own defense, and his testimony and responses to court 
inquiries indicating that he had performed his own legal research and 
had a detailed understanding of how a trial works.”142 The court 
concluded that the defendant’s failure to effectively represent himself 
“does not demonstrate that he was incompetent to do so under 
Edwards, and cannot justify denying him his right to proceed pro se.”143 
The consequences of self-representation were self-inflicted and therefore 
 
137. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing ineffective assistance of counsel). 
138. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 852 (1975) (“[T]he Court indicates 
that a pro se defendant necessarily waives any claim he might otherwise 
make of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . .”).  
139. 450 F. App’x 57 (2d Cir. 2011). 
140. Id. at 62 (quoting Appellant’s Brief).  
141. See id. at 62 (“VanHoesen argues pro se that the district court violated 
the Sixth Amendment when it failed to appoint [] counsel and forced him 
to represent himself by giving him the impression that if he proceeded 
with assigned counsel he would be stripped of his right to assist in his 
own defense.”). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
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did not amount to a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
rights.144  
Therefore, it is the court’s duty to apply the PSC standard dili-
gently to protect the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. If the de-
fendant’s self-representation appears to have violated the defendant’s 
rights, then the question is not whether the defendant’s actions on their 
own violated the Sixth Amendment but, instead, whether the court 
gave the defendant an inappropriate amount of authority that resulted 
in such a violation.  
B. Standby Counsel 
Similar to appointing a surrogate to make medical decisions for a 
patient,145 a court may appoint “standby counsel” to assist a self-
representing defendant with his defense, even against the defendant’s 
wishes.146 This type of representation creates an issue about the extent 
to which the standby counsel may participate in the trial without 
infringing on a defendant’s Faretta rights. McKaskle v. Wiggins147 held 
that standby counsel’s participation need not be excluded altogether, 
“especially when the participation is outside the presence of the jury or 
is with the defendant’s express or tacit consent.”148 McKaskle imposed 
two limitations on the extent that standby counsel’s unsolicited 
participation is allowed. First, the defendant must be able to preserve 
actual control over the defense that he chooses to present to the jury. 
 
144. Id. at 63 (“[A] court does not deprive a defendant of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel when it is the defendant himself who creates the 
conflicts that result in a breakdown of attorney-client communication.”). 
145. See Leo, supra note 19, at 132; see also White Paper on Surrogate 
Decision-Making and Advance Care Planning in Long-Term Care: The 
Hierarchy of Medical Decision-Making for Incapacitated Nursing Home 
Residents, AMDA, http://www.amda.com/governance/whitepapers/sur
rogate/decisionmaking_hierarchy.cfm (last visited Sept. 28, 2014). 
146. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77 (1984) (“In our view, both 
Faretta’s logic and its citation of the Dougherty case indicate that no 
absolute bar on standby counsel’s unsolicited participation is appropriate 
or was intended. The right to appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity 
and autonomy of the accused and to allow the presentation of what may, 
at least occasionally, be the accused’s best possible defense. Both of these 
objectives can be achieved without categorically silencing standby 
counsel.”); United States v. Walsh, 742 F.2d 1006, 1007 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(discussing “two limitations on advisory counsel participation. ‘First, the 
pro se defendant is entitled to preserve actual control over the case he 
chooses to present to the jury.’ . . . ‘Second, participation by standby 
counsel without the defendant’s consent should not be allowed to destroy 
the jury’s perception that the defendant is representing himself.’” (quoting 
McKaskle, 456 U.S. at 178)). 
147. 465 U.S. 168 (1984). 
148. Id. at 188. 
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Second, counsel’s participation should not be allowed to destroy the 
jury’s perception that the defendant is representing himself.149 Standby 
counsel may assist the defendant with procedural matters in an effort 
to preserve the integrity of the proceedings.150 If a defendant elects to 
proceed with standby counsel, some of the efficiency issues presented in 
self-representation may be eliminated while still respecting the 
defendant’s autonomy.151  
C. Restoration of PSC  
Competence to stand trial can be restored after a period of time if 
the defendant’s mental state has improved.152 Should the same be true 
for PSC? Consider the issue of the right to a speedy trial. If a defendant 
is competent to proceed with trial but is incompetent to represent 
himself at trial, then waiting for restoration of PSC creates a conflict 
between the right to a speedy trial and the right to self-representation. 
If, at the present, the defendant is incompetent to self-represent, he 
may also be incompetent to waive his right to a speedy trial in order 
to wait for PSC to be restored.153 One commentator believes that the 
right should be restorable, “especially given that the right to self-
representation is a recognized constitutional right grounded in the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.”154 This rationale places 
importance on the right to self-representation with less consideration 
for other constitutional rights that may be burdened in the process. 
However, that reasoning may be proper if the defendant values his right 
to self-representation above other constitutional rights.  
 
149. Id. at 177–78. 
150. Id. at 183. 
151. This issue raises the question of whether an intermediate level of compe-
tence could be sufficient for a defendant to conduct his own defense with 
the help of standby counsel, as opposed to completely on his own. That 
is a topic, however, for another day.  
152. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2012).  
153. This tension epitomizes the “spectrum” of competency and could give rise 
to a substandard of competency to make certain choices on the path to 
self-representation. See, e.g., Emily L. Barth, Comment, “I Can Do It 
Myself”—An Analysis of Whether Competency to Represent Oneself at 
Trial as a “Restorable Right” Within the Framework of Indiana v. 
Edwards, 79 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1139, 1139 (2011). (“Within the criminal 
justice system, a defendant’s mental competency, such as competency to 
stand trial and competency to plead, can vary depending on the defen-
dant’s present mental state. For example, if a defendant is initially 
deemed incompetent, the defendant’s competency to proceed can be 
restored—and the government actively seeks to restore the defendant’s 
competency.”). 
154. Id. 
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There are some mental illnesses, however, that are permanent. In 
this case, the defendant’s competency may never be restorable, and he 
may never be able to proceed with self-representation. This would 
create another situation in which a court would have to weigh the 
importance of the right to self-representation against the defendant’s 
other constitutional rights. 
In Edwards, the Court recognized that “[m]ental illness itself is not 
a unitary concept. It varies in degree. It can vary over time. It interferes 
with an individual’s functioning at different times in different ways.”155 
Because of these variations, it is possible that PSC can be restored as 
long as the defendant has the capacity to understand that he may be 
waiving other rights in order to pursue self-representation.  
Conclusion 
Because of the similarities between competence to make 
autonomous medical decisions and PSC, a PSC standard should be 
developed based on the same competence considerations used by the 
medical community to evaluate a patient’s treatment decision-making 
abilities. Creating a standard based on these elements will provide 
courts with a competence guideline that requires abilities higher than 
those required for competence to stand trial while still giving the trial 
judge broad discretion in the PSC standard’s application. The elements 
used to determine a medical patient’s capacities and level of competence 
balance paternalism and autonomy. The elements provide guidance 
when considering a person’s mental illness in his ability to make 
autonomous decisions. These are all important considerations in 
determining PSC, and a similarly applied standard of competence 
would protect a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights without 
compromising the integrity of the legal proceedings.  
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